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Abstract
Progress towards the MDGs is expected to slow as a consequence of the global economic downturn. 
Th   is study applies an economy-wide framework to analyze the impact of the crisis on MDG 
achievement in six Latin American countries. It ﬁ  nds signiﬁ  cant setbacks towards the goals and, in 
the case of the region’s low-income countries, the cost of achieving these would rise between 1.6 and 
3.4 per cent of GDP per year between 2010 and 2015 as compared with a no-crisis scenario. Th  e 
additional public spending would contribute to economic growth though not suﬃ   ciently for full 
recovery to pre-crisis growth.
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1.  Introduction
Substantial slowdown in the progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) should 
be expected as a consequence of the global economic crisis that emerged in 2008. Even prior to the crisis and 
despite signiﬁ  cant progress, many countries were not on track to meet most MDGs, as shown by the United 
Nations’ most recent MDG report (United Nations, 2008). Until recently, robust income growth helped 
accelerate progress towards reducing income poverty in many countries, providing every child with primary 
school education appeared to be within grasp, and important gains in assisted child delivery and coverage of 
vaccination programmes contributed to declining child and maternal mortality. However, the multiple crises 
of high food and energy prices ﬁ  rst, and the most recent global economic crisis subsequently, have created 
signiﬁ  cant setbacks. Lower government revenue and income per capita will also lead to lower public and 
private spending on social services, aﬀ  ecting the MDGs. Th   e precise magnitude of the setback is diﬃ   cult 
to estimate at this point and will vary from country to country according to existing ﬁ  scal policy space and 
institutional capacity to respond to the crisis. 
If pre-crisis trends had continued unabated, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) would likely 
be able to attain the MDGs of net enrolment in primary education, gender equality in education, coverage 
of sanitation and drinking water, and possibly also that of child mortality. Th   e speed of progress for achiev-
ing the goals for extreme poverty reduction and decreasing maternal mortality has been insuﬃ   cient, though. 
Pre-crisis progress, however, is assessed on the basis of linear projections, even though the path towards the 
goals need not follow a linear pattern. For instance, once child mortality rates have been lowered substantial-
ly, reducing them even further may require other, possibly more costly, interventions. Furthermore, policies 
may have changed since 1990, and new policies in place may make it more—or even less—likely to achieve 
the goals.
Th   e study of Vos, Ganuza, Lofgren, Sánchez, and Díaz-Bonilla (2008) applies a dynamic-recursive 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework labelled MAMS to 18 LAC countries, in order to gener-
ate a baseline scenario that more appropriately helps to assess if countries are on or oﬀ   track towards the 
MDGs under a continuation of growth and public spending trends.1 Moreover, the MAMS model duly takes 
account of non-linearities in the eﬀ  ectiveness of social spending in achieving the targets. After considering 
such aspects, the study of Vos and others ﬁ  nds that in the case of child mortality, for instance, LAC as a re-
gion no longer seems to be on track, contrary to the linear projection. Only two countries (Chile and Cuba) 
would be able to achieve the goal of reducing maternal mortality. Also, in spite of good progress in terms of 
net enrolment, the outlook is much less bright for primary school completion rates once the region’s (high) 
repetition and drop-out rates are taken into account. In contrast, the region would be on track for meeting 
the poverty-reduction target, owing mainly to the projected performance of the region’s larger economies 
(Brazil and Mexico). 
Th   e study further concludes that in all country cases (except for Chile and Cuba), social expenditure 
eﬀ  orts would need to be stepped up (in comparison with a baseline scenario that projects business-as-usual 
policies) in order to achieve the goals in primary education, child and maternal mortality, drinking water 
1   Th   e study has been published in Spanish but its comparative results for all 18 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries are available in English in Vos, Sánchez, and Kaldewei (2008).2  DESA Working Paper No. 74
and basic sanitation. Th   e costs in terms of required additional spending on MDG-related services range from 
about 1 to 7 per cent of GDP per year.2 For most countries, however, the additional cost would be less than 
3 per cent of GDP, which seems moderate in macroeconomic terms. Th   ese results suggest that achieving the 
MDGs seemed quite aﬀ  ordable for most countries in LAC—before the global economic downturn erupted, 
but in order to avoid undesirable macroeconomic trade-oﬀ  s many of the countries would need to change 
existing public ﬁ  nancing strategies. Th   e study ﬁ  nds that in most cases, increasing tax revenue would seem the 
better option as this would avoid major real exchange-rate appreciations eroding export competitiveness and/
or increased public debt distress from alternative ﬁ  nancing through domestic or external public borrowing. 
Th   e study of Vos and others, nonetheless, was completed before the global economic crisis erupted 
and continued pre-crisis rates of growth of GDP and public spending up to 2015 were assumed to apply in 
the baseline scenarios for most countries. However, as said, substantial slowdown in the progress towards the 
MDGs should be expected as a consequence of the crisis. Against this background, the present paper tries to 
answer the following questions: (i) to what extent will the global economic crisis aﬀ  ect MDG achievement?; 
(ii) how much additional public spending will be needed to achieve the MDGs by 2015 owing to the nega-
tive impact of the crisis; (iii) will governments still be able to ﬁ  nd sustainable funding for their MDG strate-
gies?; and (iv) to what extent will increased MDG spending operate as an eﬀ  ective counter-cyclical response 
for economic recovery?
To respond to these questions, this present paper applies the same economy-wide modelling meth-
odology used in the study of Vos and others, though for six Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua). An alternative baseline scenario is generated to project a recession in 
2009-2010 and a slow and gradual recovery towards pre-crisis growth levels by 2015. Th   is new ‘crisis’ baseline 
scenario as well as the MDG scenarios, which target the achievement of the MDGs for primary education, 
child and maternal mortality, and drinking water and basic sanitation goals, are compared with the “pre-crisis 
scenarios” as reported in the study of Vos and others.3 In what follows, we ﬁ  rst give a brief description of the 
contours of the MAMS modelling framework (section 2), then analyze the simulation results of the “crisis 
scenarios” (section 3), to end with a summary of the main ﬁ  ndings and policy conclusions (section 4). 
2. The MAMS framework
An economy-wide framework is required to examine the capacity and ﬁ  nancing constraints of coun-
tries to achieving the MDGs and the macroeconomic trade-oﬀ  s associated with diﬀ  erent ﬁ  nancing strategies 
2   Th   e upper bound cost of 7 per cent of GDP per annum is estimated for Honduras. As reported in the 
study of Vos and others, this cost would be a little more than 5 per cent of GDP per annum since spending 
in other public infrastructure is also scaled up in the MDG scenarios and this enables faster achievement 
of the goals owing to which the MDG strategy is less costly. Another country whose required additional 
spending on MDG-related services was found to be high was Guatemala for which a 6 per cent of GDP 
per annum was estimated.
3   Th   e MAMS framework takes no account of speciﬁ  c interventions to reduce income poverty. As a consequence, 
whether the target for poverty reduction (MDG 1) is analyzed or not is irrelevant to estimating how much more 
additional public spending will be needed to achieve the other goals by 2015 owing to the negative impact of the crisis. 
For this reason, the target for poverty reduction is not analyzed here. In the study by Vos and others (2008), poverty 
outcomes are assumed to result from the employment and income eﬀ  ects generated throughout the economy under 
the baseline and MDG scenarios for which a method of microsimulations is applied using micro data sets. Th  e  study 
concludes that, in more than half of the 18 countries studied, increased MDG-related public spending does not induce 
suﬃ   ciently strong employment and income-distribution eﬀ  ects to make adequate progress towards the required level 
of poverty reduction. A future extension of the present paper is to determine how income poverty would be aﬀ  ected 
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for timely achievement of the goals. Th   e existence of a wide range of interaction eﬀ  ects is the rationale for 
the use of a CGE model. Th   e pursuit of a strategy towards the achievement of the MDGs will likely have 
strong eﬀ  ects throughout the economy. It will undoubtedly aﬀ  ect the demand for and supply of diﬀ  erent 
types of goods and services, labour and capital, and foreign exchange, and the related adjustments may imply 
important trade-oﬀ  s throughout the period for achieving the MDGs. Th   e general equilibrium framework 
also takes into consideration the possible synergies between the diﬀ  erent MDGs. Such synergies may inﬂ  u-
ence the required expansion of services (e.g., greater coverage of drinking water supply may reduce the need 
for health service expansion) or the speed at which the various MDGs are achieved. Studies that take all of 
these general equilibrium and synergy eﬀ  ects into account may generate substantially diﬀ  erent outcomes 
than studies that focus exclusively on sector analyses.
Th   e outcomes will also depend to an important extent on the way in which the strategy is ﬁ  nanced. 
Foreign ﬁ  nancing may induce real exchange rate eﬀ  ects, while ﬁ  nancing through domestic taxes could 
reduce private consumption demand, among other things, and domestic borrowing could crowd out credit 
resources for private investment. Policymakers thus may face important trade-oﬀ  s. No doubt, increased 
public spending is essential for achieving the MDGs, but adjustments in the real exchange rate, real wages 
and other relative prices may increase the unit costs for achieving the MDGs along with the costs for other 
sectors, or discourage exports, thereby widening the external deﬁ  cit that needs to be ﬁ  nanced, and so on. Th  e 
productivity gains from greater MDG achievement will take some time to materialize and are thus unlikely 
to impact growth visibly in the short and medium terms. Th   erefore, it is critical that short-run trade-oﬀ  s not 
oﬀ  set potential economic and social gains in the longer run.
Dynamic CGE models for the simulation of policies aimed at human development goals have been 
developed before in studies during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in those providing analytical depth to the 
so-called basic needs approach to development (see, e.g., Kouwenaar, 1986; Hopkins and van der Hoeven, 
1982). At the time, such exercises were very time-consuming and costly because of data and computational 
limitations. Later, the shift away from concerns about employment, income distribution and poverty towards 
macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in mainstream development policies also de-emphasized 
the need for such modelling eﬀ  orts. More recently, work undertaken at the World Bank has revived the ap-
proach in the context of the ongoing debate about scaling up resources to achieve the MDGs. Th  is  newly 
developed framework has been labelled MAMS (Maquette for MDG Simulation) and was originally present-
ed in Lofgren (2004). A version with more limiting assumptions can be found in Bourguignon and others 
(2004). Th   e framework was originally designed to deal in particular with low-income country contexts and 
the trade-oﬀ  s associated with the scaling-up of aid inﬂ  ows for MDG-related expenditures. It has been ex-
tended and applied in the context of the aforementioned study of Vos and others covering 18 LAC countries. 
In what follows we highlight some of the main features of MAMS relevant for the discussion around the 
simulation results in the following section.4
Th   e MAMS framework has been built from a fairly standard CGE framework with dynamic-recur-
sive features but incorporates a special module which speciﬁ  es the main determinants of MDG achievement 
and the direct impact of enhanced public expenditures on MDG-related infrastructure and services. MAMS 
considers speciﬁ  c targets for the MDGs of poverty reduction (MDG 1), achieving universal primary educa-
tion (MDG 2), reducing under-ﬁ  ve and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) and increasing access to safe 
water and basic sanitation (MDGs 7a and 7b). In the case of MDG 2, the demand for primary and other 
4   Chapter 3 of the study of Vos and others provides a detailed description of MAMS as applied for the LAC countries.4  DESA Working Paper No. 74
levels of schooling is a function of student behaviour (enrolment, repetition, graduation). Student behav-
iour, in turn, depends on the quality of education (identiﬁ  ed by variables such as classroom availability and 
student-teacher ratios), income incentives (the expected wage premium from education), the under-ﬁ  ve 
mortality rate (a proxy for the health status of the potential student population), household consumption 
per capita (a proxy for the capacity to pay for education and for opportunity costs) and the level of public 
infrastructure (a proxy for the eﬀ  ective distance to school). Under-ﬁ  ve and maternal mortality are considered 
to be determined by the availability of public and private health services, household consumption per capita, 
the level of public infrastructure (a proxy for the eﬀ  ective distance to health centres and hospitals), and the 
coverage of water and sanitation services. Access to water and sanitation, on the other hand, is modelled as a 
function of household consumption per capita, the provision of such services by public or private providers 
and the level of public infrastructure. Achievements in the reduction of income poverty are measured as the 
outcome of the overall general equilibrium eﬀ  ects from dynamic adjustments in production, employment, 
wages and other relative prices, as well as changes in the quality of human capital through MDG-related 
expenditures.
MAMS includes a relatively detailed speciﬁ  cation of social services related to the MDGs, spell-
ing out diﬀ  erent levels of education, diﬀ  erent health sectors, sectors for drinking water and sanitation, and 
other public infrastructure. According to the model’s speciﬁ  cations, these services may be provided publicly 
or privately. Nonetheless, it is only new government investment and current expenditures that will lead to a 
policy-driven increase in the supply of MDG-related services and public infrastructure. Increased spending 
in public infrastructure, in turn, impacts positively on other MDGs for which public spending also needs to 
be scaled up to reach the targets. For this to take place, the Government has to mobilize suﬃ   cient—domestic 
or foreign—resources to ﬁ  nance those new investments and expenditures.
Th   e average skill level of the labour force will increase over time as more better-educated gradu-
ates leave the schooling system. Th   is will in turn enhance productivity growth, with subsequent wage- and 
income-distribution eﬀ  ects. Output growth may be fostered as a result of those productivity gains, potential-
ly triggering economy-wide eﬀ  ects which in turn will aﬀ  ect MDG achievement.5 Achievements in drinking 
water and sanitation supply also help to improve health conditions, and improved health status may in turn 
impact positively on education outcomes along with other determinants. 
Per capita household consumption responds positively to the Government’s increasing the sup-
ply of MDG-related services, and this may have further favourable implications for MDG achievement. 
However, since MAMS is an economy-wide model, per capita household consumption can also change as a 
result of relative price changes or could be aﬀ  ected by increased taxes to ﬁ  nance the additional MDG-related 
spending. Furthermore, all domestic income changes aﬀ  ect the economy’s capacity to generate savings. Th  e 
macroeconomic viability of ﬁ  nancing the new MDG-sector investment will depend on the macroeconomic 
constraints of the country, the initial debt burden, the source of ﬁ  nancing, and the productivity of public 
investments towards the MDGs, among other factors. 
5   A productivity parameter for each MDG-related sector can also allow the simulation of eﬃ   ciency 
improvements in the delivery of such services. While the MAMS framework in principle allows the 
capture of such eﬃ   ciency gains, the key problem is to obtain quantitative estimates for such externalities. 
Th   is would require further country-level investigation. Th   e MAMS-based country analyses presented 
in the study of Vos and others as well as in this paper do not consider such productivity gains and 
therefore, potentially, may underestimate the possible welfare gains from the MDG strategy. It could be 
argued, however, that because of the time lags involved between MDG investments today and enhanced 
productivity of workers tomorrow, most gains are likely to become eﬀ  ective after 2015, assuming that with 
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3. Scenario analysis 
Assumptions of the “crisis scenarios”
Th   e “pre-crisis scenarios” reported in the study of Vos and others (2008) take as a benchmark a base-
line scenario of continued growth and public spending trends where most countries grow at respectable rates. 
Th   e new assumption of the “crisis scenarios” as analyzed in this paper is that real GDP (at factor cost) and 
real public spending do not grow in 2009-2010 and they subsequently recover slowly and gradually towards 
pre-crisis growth levels by 2015.6 Given this new assumption, both public spending and GDP no longer 
grow at past trends during 2009-2015 in the baseline scenario, as in the study of Vos and others. In order to 
assess the extent to which scaling up spending in public infrastructure would aﬀ  ect both MDG achievement 
and economic recovery, the MDG scenarios that use the crisis baseline scenario as their benchmark were 
also generated under the assumption that public spending on non-MDG public infrastructure is 3 percent-
age points of GDP higher during 2010-2015. Th   e main results of the “crisis scenarios” are presented and 
discussed below; supplementary results can be found in the statistical annex. For comparison, some results of 
the study of Vos and others are also presented.
Impact of the crisis on the MDGs
We ﬁ nd that the projected recession in 2009 and 2010, followed by the slow recovery towards pre-
crisis growth levels by 2015, would put some of the region’s low-income countries (Bolivia, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua) substantially further oﬀ   track towards the goals for primary school completion, child and mater-
nal mortality and access to drinking water and basic sanitation. Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica that seemed 
well on track towards achieving most of the MDGs by 2015 under a continuation of spending and growth 
trends, would fall short on several of the targets because of the crisis. As shown in Figure 1, there would be 
pronounced setbacks for primary school completion and child mortality. Progress towards the targets for 
reducing maternal mortality and increasing coverage of water and sanitation would also decelerate visibly as 
shown in Table A1. 
Costs of achieving the MDGs by 2015
To make up for lost MDG progress owing to the crisis, Governments of Bolivia, Honduras and 
Nicaragua would need to spend an extra 1.6 (Bolivia) to 3.4 (Honduras) per cent of GDP per year on educa-
tion, health, and basic services between 2010 and 2015 in order to achieve the MDGs, as compared with the 
pre-crisis scenario and if externally ﬁ  nanced (see Figure 2 and Table A2). Th   is would come on top of an ad-
ditional required annual social spending of 2 per cent of GDP in Bolivia, 5 per cent in Nicaragua, and 7 per 
cent in Honduras in absence of the crisis.7 For Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica, the required additional spend-
ing caused by the expected impact of the crisis would be in the order of between 0.5 and 1.5 per cent of 
6   In the updated baseline forecast for 2009-2010 of the United Nations’ World Economic Situation and Prospects as per 
mid-2009 (http://www.un.org/esa/policy), Brazil, Chile, and Honduras are expected to have negative GDP growth in 
2009 and weakly positive growth in 2010 (assuming some global recovery in that year). Only Bolivia is projected to 
have meager positive growth of 1-1.5 per cent on both years, while Costa Rica and Nicaragua are projected to suﬀ  er 
negative growth in both 2009 and 2010. For the sake of comparability, in the present exercise it is assumed that all 
countries have no growth at all in 2009 and 2010. In subsequent analysis, the analysis will also be conducted for 
country-speciﬁ  c growth projections.
7   As mentioned in a previous footnote, the additional required annual social spending reported in Vos and others 
(2008) is about 5 per cent of GDP per annum for Honduras, since the MDG scenarios consider the synergy eﬀ  ect 
of increasing spending in public infrastructure on achieving the goals. In contrast, the 7 per cent of GDP additional 
required annual social spending reported here for Honduras is found for MDG scenarios in which public infrastructure 
spending is not scaled up at the same time.6  DESA Working Paper No. 74
GDP per annum. Clearly, additional costs of this magnitude may overstretch government ﬁ  nances and lead 
to unsustainable increases in public debt and become a source of macroeconomic instability further down 
the line if recovery and sustained growth do not set it swiftly.
MDG spending and economic recovery
Further analysis shows that increased social spending as part of the MDG strategy is counter-cyclical 
and would contribute to growth recovery, albeit not enough to return swiftly to pre-crisis levels of economic 
growth (see Figure 3). Th   is is so because spending on MDG-related services represents relatively low shares 
of aggregate demand in the countries under study. Stronger growth eﬀ  ects likely will emerge over time, 
however, as improved education and health outcomes should be expected to underpin stronger productivity 
growth. Not surprisingly, the short-term counter-cyclical eﬀ  ects of the MDG strategy spending are strongest 
where the required increase in public spending is strongest, as is the case in Bolivia and Honduras. Th  e  eﬀ  ect 
is surprisingly weaker in Nicaragua, where enhanced ﬁ  scal spending is causing stronger real exchange rate ap-
preciation, such that the aggregate demand impulse is partially oﬀ  set by a further weakening of exports. 
Th   e counter-cyclical response becomes much stronger if the MDG strategy is complemented by 
much needed investments in public infrastructure in these countries as also shown in Figure 3. Yet for all 
countries it holds that other factors need to contribute as well for full recovery, especially resumption of 
external demand is essential in light of the results that are explained next.
Figure 1
Impact of the crisis on primary school completion and child mortality rates by 2015 in selected Latin American 
countries (percentage change)a
Source: Vos and others (2008) for the pre-crisis scenarios and authors’ MAMS simulation results for the crisis scenarios.
a  Results refer to percentage change in primary school completion rates and child mortality rates, respectively, comparing outcomes 
for crisis and pre-crisis baseline scenarios by 2015. Th   e pre-crisis scenario assumes continued growth trends for GDP and public 
spending up to 2015 from around 2000 to 2007. Th   e crisis baseline scenario assumes signiﬁ  cant growth deceleration for GDP 
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Figure 3
Simulated countercyclical impact of increased MDG and public infrastructure spending on GDP growth, 2010-2015 
(average annual rate of growth in per cent)a
Source: Vos and others (2008) for the pre-crisis scenarios and authors’ MAMS simulation results for the crisis scenarios.
a  For this ﬁ  gure the MDG strategy is one in which all additional public spending for MDGs needed to achieve education, health, 
and water and sanitation targets by 2015 is ﬁ  nanced through foreign borrowing. Th   e gap to full recovery is the diﬀ  erence between 
the pre-crisis rate of GDP growth and the simulated rate of GDP growth in the scenario of increased public spending for MDG 
achievement and expansion of infrastructure.
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Figure 2
Additional public spending for MDGs needed to achieve education, health and water and sanitation targets by 2015 
(percentage of GDP; average annual cost for 2010-2015)a
Source: Vos and others (2008) for the pre-crisis scenarios and authors’ MAMS simulation results for the crisis scenarios.
a  Estimates refer to the diﬀ  erence between the levels of public spending needed to achieve the targets by 2015 in the MDG 
scenario with foreign borrowing and the baseline scenario under both pre-crisis and crisis baseline assumptions. MDG targets are 
for primary school completion (100 per cent), child and maternal mortality (two-third and three-quarter reductions, respectively, 
from 1990 levels), and drinking water and sanitation (reducing people without access by half).







pre-crisis crisis8  DESA Working Paper No. 74
Feasibility of ﬁ  nancing additional public spending for MDGs
Th   e increase in the required additional spending to achieve the MDGs owing to the simulated 
eﬀ  ects of the crisis would likely make it implausible for some countries to ﬁ  nance the MDG strategy by in-
creasing either taxes or public borrowing. For the pre-crisis scenarios, Vos and others (2008) had concluded 
that the required increase in the tax burden would seem feasible in those cases where this would be in the 
range of 1.0-2.5 per cent of GDP over the whole simulation period (to 2015). Th   ese cases included Brazil 
and Costa Rica, among others. Beyond the (somewhat arbitrarily chosen) upper bound of the indicated 
range, tax reform should be expected to be much more demanding for a variety of reasons, including politi-
cal constraints. With this in mind, the feasibility of tax ﬁ  nancing when the eﬀ  ects of the crisis are taken into 
consideration could be reassessed by computing the magnitude by which the annual average of income-tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP for 2010-2015 in the MDG ﬁ  nancing scenario would have to change with 
respect to the baseline scenario in order to achieve the MDGs. Th   e estimated required tax increase in the cri-
sis scenarios is then compared with that for the pre-crisis scenarios.8 By this measure, tax ﬁ  nancing remains 
a feasible strategy only for Chile when the simulated eﬀ  ects of the crisis are taken into consideration (see 
Table A3). It may no longer be very feasible in the cases of Costa Rica and Brazil, which in the crisis scenario 
would have to raise income tax revenue, respectively, by about 4 and 3 percentage points of GDP. To achieve 
such a tax increase in the remaining ﬁ  ve years to 2015 seems a tall order. In the other three countries, the 
required tax increases were already unfeasibly large in the pre-crisis scenarios. Th   e crisis scenarios suggests 
that tax ﬁ  nancing of the strategy would require raising the tax burden by 4.3, 13.2 and almost 6.4 per cent 
of GDP per annum in the cases of Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, respectively.
In the pre-crisis scenarios, total public debt was found to rise to 65 per cent of GDP or (much) 
more under the domestic and external borrowing scenarios in all 18 country cases except for Peru (see 
Table A.3 for the six countries under analysis). Th   is would put public indebtedness beyond critical levels of 
sustainability in most countries—even under the much higher growth paths of the pre-crisis scenarios. Th  e 
debt outlook worsens when the eﬀ  ects of the crisis are taken into consideration owing to the fact that, as ex-
plained earlier, the amount of spending that needs to be ﬁ  nanced increases. A MDG ﬁ  nancing strategy based 
on borrowing might perhaps only work for Chile where the pre-crisis debt stock is fairly small. If measured 
as earlier for the revenue-to-GDP ratio, Chile’s GDP-to-debt ratio would only have to increase by about 2.5 
percentage points. 
Given the above, for Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua, who are eligible for debt relief under the 
HIPC initiative and the multilateral debt relief initiative, aid ﬁ  nancing of the additional MDG-spending 
would seem as the most feasible option in a time when these countries’ economy is being seriously hit by the 
crisis. Th   is, of course, would be provided that donors are willing to support countries like these, to whom 
they have already transferred signiﬁ  cant amounts of development assistance under the HIPC initiative. Even 
if such ﬁ  nancial support were readily available, these countries should consider enhancing domestic resource 
mobilization also, especially through tax reform, in order to reduce aid dependency over time. Brazil and 
Costa Rica will have no option other than seeking a combination of tax reform and very limited public 
borrowing. For all countries, it applies that an eﬀ  ective crisis response should also entail taking measures to 
increase in the eﬃ   ciency of MDG-related spending.
8   Th   is is a correct approach to the extent that the pre-crisis and crisis baseline scenarios are diﬀ  erent such that tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is measured in diﬀ  erent scales. Th   is in fact explains why, for Bolivia and Chile, for 
example, annual average income-tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is lower in the crisis scenarios compared with in 
the pre-crisis scenarios (see Table A3).Impact of the global crisis on the MDGs in Latin America          9
4. Conclusion and policy implications 
Th   is paper used a comprehensive general equilibrium modelling framework for six Latin American 
countries to ﬁ  nd that a projected recession in 2009 and 2010 and a slow and gradual recovery towards pre-
crisis growth levels by 2015 would put some of the region’s low-income countries (Bolivia, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) substantially further oﬀ   track towards the MDGs for primary school completion, child and ma-
ternal mortality, and access to drinking water and basic sanitation. Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica that seemed 
well on track towards achieving most of these goals by 2015, would fall short in meeting several targets 
because of the crisis.
Governments of Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua would need to spend an extra 1.6 to 3.4 per cent 
of GDP per year on education, health and basic services between 2010 and 2015 to achieve the MDGs, 
as compared with the pre-crisis scenario. Th   is would come on top of an additional required annual social 
spending of 2 per cent of GDP in Bolivia, 5 per cent in Nicaragua, and 7 per cent in Honduras in absence of 
the crisis. For Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica, the required additional spending caused by the expected impact 
of the crisis would be between 0.5 and 1.5 per cent of GDP per annum. Clearly, additional costs of this 
magnitude may stretch government ﬁ  nances, lead to unsustainable increases in public debt, and become a 
source of macroeconomic instability in the future, if recovery and sustained growth do not set in swiftly.
Further analysis shows that increased social spending would contribute to growth recoveries. How-
ever, countries would not return swiftly to pre-crisis levels of economic growth and employment as spending 
on MDG-related services represents relatively low shares of aggregate demand in these countries. Stronger 
growth eﬀ  ects are likely to emerge over time as improved education and health outcomes underpin stronger 
productivity growth. Th   e counter-cyclical response becomes much stronger if the MDG strategy is comple-
mented by needed investments in public infrastructure. For a full recovery, however, other factors need to 
contribute as well, especially the resumption of external demand. Th   is will require globally concerted stimu-
lus measures to take eﬀ  ect.
External ﬁ  nancial support in the form of aid and/or debt relief will be required to provide the ad-
ditional ﬁ  scal space and avoid an insurmountable rise in external debt, especially in low-income countries. 
Careful macroeconomic management would nonetheless be required to avoid growth costs elsewhere in the 
economy—especially a loss of competitiveness in export sectors owing to appreciation of the real exchange. 
Th   e upshot is that counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies can be feasibly aligned with long-term develop-
ment objectives if carefully managed and supported by the international community. 10  DESA Working Paper No. 74
Statistical annex
Table A1
Achievement of the MDGs under pre-crisis and crisis baseline scenarios in six Latin American countries, 2015
Country MDG 2 MDG 4 MDG 5a  MDG 7a MDG 7b
Indicatorb Target Indicatorc Target Indicatord Target Indicatore Target Indicatorf Target
Bolivia
Pre-crisis scenariosg 93.4 100.0 40.0 30.0 -- -- 76.1 79.0 57.1 64.0
Crisis scenarios 1h 89.1 100.0 46.9 30.0 -- -- 72.2 79.0 46.3 64.0
Brazil
Pre-crisis scenariosg 79.8 100.0 19.8 16.0 -- -- 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Crisis scenarios 1h 78.3 100.0 22.0 16.0 -- -- 99.8 100.0 99.9 100.0
Chile
Pre-crisis scenariosg 98.0 100.0 5.0 6.4 10.0 10.0 99.4 99.0 98.9 97.2
Crisis scenarios 1h 98.0 100.0 5.1 6.4 10.0 10.0 98.8 99.0 96.6 97.2
Costa Rica
Pre-crisis scenariosg 99.1 100.0 7.0 6.0 25.4 20.0 80.5 80.5 93.5 93.5
Crisis scenarios 1h 98.3 100.0 7.3 6.0 27.1 20.0 79.8 80.5 93.5 93.5
Honduras
Pre-crisis scenariosg 90.7 100.0 32.6 24.0 90.0 69.9 85.2 95.0 81.5 95.0
Crisis scenarios 1h 84.6 100.0 37.4 24.0 100.4 69.9 83.2 95.0 78.4 95.0
Nicaragua
Pre-crisis scenariosg 71.9 100.0 24.3 22.7 48.9 40.0 83.3 85.3 65.4 72.5
Crisis scenarios 1h 65.6 100.0 25.8 22.7 57.9 40.0 83.0 85.3 63.7 72.5
Source:  Vos and others (2008) for the pre-crisis scenarios and authors’ MAMS simulation results for the crisis scenarios.
a  Entries have been left blank when MDG 5 was not analysed for the corresponding country in the study for LAC.
b  On-time primary school completion rate.
c Under-ﬁ  ve mortality rate (per 1,000 live births). For Bolivia, the indicator is the infant (under-one) mortality rate.
d  Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births except for Chile for which per 10,000 live births is used).
e  Percentage of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water.
f  Percentage of the population without sustainable access to basic sanitation.
g  Baseline and MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios as reported in the study of Vos and others (2008).
h  Scenarios based on a baseline whereby real GDP (at factor cost) and real public spending do not to grow in 2009-2010 and 
recover steadily from 2011 until converging to the pre-crisis annual average growth rate by 2015.Impact of the global crisis on the MDGs in Latin America          11
Table A2
Required additional public spending for achieving the MDGsa under alternative fi  nancing scenarios in six Latin 
American countries, 2010-2015 (percentage of GDP)
Public spending in 
BAU scenario
Required additional public spending 
MDG scenario with 
foreign grants
MDG scenario with 
income taxes
MDG scenario with 
foreign borrowing














Pre-crisis scenariosd 17.5 4.1 1.3 1.5 3.4 3.5 1.8 2.0 3.4 3.5
Crisis scenarios 1e 15.4 4.1 3.3 3.6 4.1 4.3 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.6
Crisis scenarios 2f 15.4 4.1 5.8 2.9 6.5 3.6 5.8 2.9 5.8 2.9
Brazil
Pre-crisis scenariosd 20.6 9.4 -- -- 2.1 2.3 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.3
Crisis scenarios 1e 23.1 10.5 -- -- 3.1 3.4 2.0 2.6 3.2 3.4
Crisis scenarios 2f 23.1 10.5 -- -- 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.6 3.7 3.6
Chile
Pre-crisis scenariosd 12.7 4.9 -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Crisis scenarios 1e 12.7 4.9 -- -- 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Crisis scenarios 2f 12.7 4.9 -- -- 4.2 1.3 2.7 0.1 4.2 1.3
Costa Rica
Pre-crisis scenariosd 13.8 6.1 -- -- 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.2
Crisis scenarios 1e 15.0 7.5 -- -- 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.1 3.1 2.9
Crisis scenarios 2f 15.0 7.5 -- -- 4.9 2.0 4.2 1.4 5.4 2.2
Honduras
Pre-crisis scenariosd 18.5 7.3 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.3
Crisis scenarios 1e 16.0 6.9 10.4 10.3 10.7 10.6 10.4 10.3 10.7 10.6
Crisis scenarios 2f 16.0 6.9 11.9 9.1 12.3 9.5 11.9 9.1 12.3 9.5
Nicaragua
Pre-crisis scenariosd 30.2 6.6 4.1 4.9 5.3 6.1 4.1 4.9 7.3 6.4
Crisis scenarios 1c 24.3 5.3 5.8 6.5 7.4 8.1 5.8 6.5 10.1 9.0
Crisis scenarios 2f 24.3 5.3 6.6 4.8 8.2 6.4 6.6 4.8 10.5 7.1
Source: Vos and others (2008) for the pre-crisis scenarios and authors’ MAMS simulation results for the crisis scenarios.
a Th   e MDGs being achieved by 2015 are the following: MDG 2 (100 per cent on-time primary school completion rates for the 
relevant age cohort), MDG 4 (reduction of the under-ﬁ  ve mortality rate by two-thirds from 1990), MDG 5 (reduction of the 
maternal mortality ratio by three-quarters from 1990), and MDG 7 (reduction of the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation). 
b  MDG-related public spending comprises ﬁ  nal-consumption and investment spending in primary education, health, and water 
and sanitation. 
c  Annual average public spending under the respective MDGs ﬁ  nancing scenario minus the annual average public spending 
under the baseline scenario, all in percentage points of GDP. Th   e additional public spending for achieving MDG 5 is not 
accounted for in the cases of Bolivia and Brazil. Some entries have been left blank because the MDG scenario with foreign 
grants is irrelevant in the context of the country.
d  Baseline and MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios as reported in the study of Vos and others (2008).
e  Scenarios based on a baseline whereby real GDP (at factor cost) and real public spending do not to grow in 2009-2010 and 
recover steadily from 2011 until converging to the pre-crisis annual average growth rate by 2015.
f Th   ese are the “crisis scenarios” assuming also that public spending on non-MDG public infrastructure is 3 percentage points of 
GDP higher during 2010-2015.12  DESA Working Paper No. 74
  
Table A3
Annual average income-tax revenue (2010-2015) and total cumulated public debt (2015) under the baseline and 
MDG fi  nancing scenarios in six Latin American countries (percentage of GDP)
BAU scenario
MDG scenario with 
income taxes
MDG scenario with 
foreign borrowing
MDG scenario with 
domestic borrowing
 Revenue Debt Revenue Debt Revenue Debt Revenue Debt
Bolivia
Pre-crisis scenariosa 8.1 52.4 11.0 51.6 8.1 95.6 8.1 111.4
Crisis scenarios 1b 6.1 57.0 10.4 54.8 6.1 116.1 6.1 116.1
Crisis scenarios 2c 6.1 57.0 10.5 52.5 6.1 126.9 6.1 126.9
Brazil
Pre-crisis scenariosa 14.2 56.1 19.8 55.1 14.2 105.2 15.9 171.0
Crisis scenarios 1b 18.2 56.6 25.4 54.8 18.3 109.9 20.7 161.4
Crisis scenarios 2c 18.2 56.6 26.6 54.5 18.3 99.1 20.8 167.1
Chile
Pre-crisis scenariosa 5.3 13.7 5.2 13.7 5.3 16.3 5.3 16.7
Crisis scenarios 1b 4.5 16.5 4.9 16.5 4.5 21.4 4.6 22.1
Crisis scenarios 2c 4.5 16.5 19.7 16.0 4.6 38.9 4.7 34.7
Costa Rica
Pre-crisis scenariosa 3.6 51.8 4.8 52.1 3.6 66.5 3.7 86.0
Crisis scenarios 1b 5.1 51.6 8.0 52.0 5.1 75.2 5.4 102.4
Crisis scenarios 2c 5.1 51.6 10.1 50.9 5.1 80.1 5.4 112.1
Honduras
Pre-crisis scenariosa 8.6 68.8 18.6 66.4 8.4 112.6 8.7 131.0
Crisis scenarios 1b 3.9 80.1 17.1 77.4 3.8 130.4 4.0 162.1
Crisis scenarios 2c 3.9 80.1 18.5 75.4 3.8 134.0 4.0 164.6
Nicaragua
Pre-crisis scenariosa 2.6 127.8 6.5 124.6 2.6 158.3 2.7 192.7
Crisis scenarios 1b 2.7 137.8 9.1 133.5 3.6 175.5 3.7 224.0
Crisis scenarios 2c 3.2 137.8 10.0 131.8 4.2 174.3 3.8 221.1
Source: Vos and others (2008) for the pre-crisis scenarios and authors’ MAMS simulation results for the crisis scenarios.
a  Baseline and MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios as reported in the study of Vos and others (2008).
b  Scenarios based on a baseline whereby real GDP (at factor cost) and real public spending do not to grow in 2009-2010 and 
recover steadily from 2011 until converging to the pre-crisis annual average growth rate by 2015.
c Th   ese are the “crisis scenarios” assuming also that public spending on non-MDG public infrastructure is 3 percentage points of 
GDP higher during 2010-2015.Impact of the global crisis on the MDGs in Latin America          13
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